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Abstract
The dominance of English language content on the Internet raises a question of
how consumer bilingualism in a given country a¤ects the amount of home language
content and the countrys welfare. We address this question by studying two-sided
market competition between a foreign and a domestic content distribution platform
in a small open economy. On the one hand, bilingualism has the benet of increasing
cross-side network externalities by increasing consumer concentration on the foreign
platform, which increases the amount of home language content. On the other hand,
bilingualism exposes home language content to competition from foreign language
content and softens platform competition, which reduces the amount of home lan-
guage content. We nd that bilingualism mostly increases consumer surplus but can
reduce domestic producer surplus. The welfare e¤ect of taxing the foreign platform
is also analyzed.
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1 Introduction
During its early days, the World Wide Web was by and large a medium based on English
language. Although, with the globalization of the Internet, the presence of other languages
has steadily risen, the dominance of English does not vanish. According to a UNESCO
publication (Pimienta et al., 2009), the share of English web pages decreased from 75% in
1998 to 45% in 2007 and the share of English speaking users from 60% in 1998 to 32% in
2007 (see Figure 1). These shares are quite high relative to the share of English speakers
in the world population, which is 10.1%. Furthermore, the dominance of English content
in the Internet continues to prevail: according to Web Technology Surveys, English is
used by 59.4% of all the websites whose content language is known.1 This dominance of
English raises a natural question: how bilingualism of a given country (i.e., the ability of
the countrys population to speak English as well as its native language) a¤ects the amount
of home language content and the domestic welfare?
This question is important from an economic point of view because of the steadily
growing share of international online trade (including trade in digital goods and services)
in total trade and because linguistic barriers are the main source of frictions and trade costs
in cross-border e-commerce.2 The question is also important because of its implication for
linguistic and cultural diversity.3 As a rst step to address these issues, this paper studies
how bilingualism a¤ects competition between online platforms and the amount of home
language content in a small open economy.
Interactions between consumers and content providers in the Internet are mediated by
platforms such as iTunes, Google Play, and Amazon Kindle for music, ebooks, games and
movies. These also include specialized vertical search engines such as Google Shopping and
Kayak (and general search engines such as Google and Bing, to some extent), as well as
online intermediaries for e-commerce such as eBay and Amazon Marketplace.
Our analytical framework is mainly motivated by online business-to-consumer (B-to-C)
platforms which facilitate trade in digitized cultural goods such as books, songs, movies,
and games, consumption of which involves knowing the language in which these goods were
1The data are available at https://w3techs.com/technologies/overview/content_language/all and were
accessed on April 3,2020.
2Based on the consumer survey, Martens and Turlea (2012) estimate that the share of online trade in
total cross-border trade in goods between the EU member states is in the range between 6 and 12 percent.
3There is a wide concern among experts and policy-makers about e¤ects of the Internet on linguistic and
cultural diversity. For instance, according to UNESCOs experts, given the current trend, more than 50
percent of the estimated 7,000 languages spoken in the world today may disappear within a few generations
(see UNESCO, 2008, p. 16). See more on the e¤ect of the Internet on the linguistic and cultural diversity
in Crystal (2006).
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created. There are many examples of competition between U.S.-based platforms and plat-
forms originating outside of the U.S. For instance, the aforementioned Amazon competes
against Tmall.com (owned by Alibaba Group), 360Buy.com, and Suning.com in China.
In the more narrowly dened ebooks market, Amazons Kindle faces competition from
platforms such as Rakuten (Japan), Libri (Germany), Fnac (France), Cloudary (China),
Kyobo (Korea). In streaming video on demand (SVOD), Netix competes in France against
French pay TV groups Canal Plus and Orange Cinema Series4 and against several local
players in China.5 In streaming audio, the U.S.-based platforms Spotify and iTunes as well
as Frances platform Deezer compete against the major domestic online music distributor
MelOn in the Korean market.
To further motivate the research questions raised in this paper and to provide an em-
pirical illustration of the real-world context in which our theory framework is likely to be
relevant, we analyze the quantitative relationship between the market share of English lan-
guage content-distribution platforms and the English language prociency of country popu-
lations around the world. More specically, in this illustration, we rely on the monthly app
engagement data (numbers of app downloads and active app users) generated by Google
Play Store for Android-compatible e-reader platforms in 29 countries where English is not
a native language of the majority of people. The data set is provided by a web analytics
company called SimilarWeb. In the Appendix, we summarize the data set and discuss its
limitations and a number of assumptions we had to make in this empirical illustration.
An e-reader platform is an Android app6 which gives users both free and paid access
to a variety of e-book titles to read on Android devices (such as a smartphone or a tablet
computer).7 There are three major e-reader platforms of the English-language origin which
4The entry of Netix in European countries has generated concerns regarding creation of European
content. For instance, the French lm producersassociation complained that "Neix is engaging in "scal
dumping" by establishing its European base in Amsterdam and thus avoiding the French audiovisual taxes
that national television channels and rival streaming services pay to subsidize French lms." (The New
York Times, "Europeans Bracing for Netix", by Doreen Carvajal, September 12, 2014).
5The major SVOD players in China are iQIYI (an independent subsidiary of Baidu) and Tmall Box
O¢ ce (or TBO) o¤ered by the e-commerce giant Alibaba. There are also several smaller players such as
LeTV, Sohu, and Yoku Tudou. See, http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2016/01/13/netix-
is-now-global-but-is-chinas-market-key-for-its-international-success
6Certainly, there is also a large variety of e-reader apps designed for Apple iOS (iPhones and iPads)
and Windows operating system devices, but SimilarWeb does not provide public access to world-wide user
engagement data for Apple- and Windows-compatible apps and limits such access only to the U.S. data.
However, if the U.S. data is any indication, the shares of the leading e-reader apps (in terms of downloads
and active users) on Android devices is very similar to their shares on Apple and Windows devices. See
https://www.similarweb.com/.
7Most of e-books these days are read on tablets and smartphones (iPhones, iPads, as well as
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are not tied with the Android operating system and have a¢ liated on-line bookstores
o¤ering both English and non-English e-book titles: Amazon Kindle, Rakuten Kobo Books
and Scribd. 24 of the 29 countries in the SimilarWebs data set have at least one well-
known domestic e-reader platform, which provides access to both free and paid titles in the
domestic language.
To measure English language prociency, we rely on the English Prociency Index (EPI)
provided by a global language training company EF Education First (see EF Education
First, 2019). The EPI is based on the annual comprehensive English test data collected
from non-native English speakers in 100 countries.
Consider bivariate correlation between the EPI and the individual market share of
Kindle as well as the combined market share of Kindle, Kobo and Scribd (KKS), as shown
in Table 1. Although not all of these relationships are statistically signicant, their signs
suggest that the foreign platforms market share increases with the proportion of bilingual
consumers.8
Table 1: Correlations between the English Prociency Index and English-language
e-reader platformsmarket shares in 28 countries.9
Correlation p value
Amazon Kindles download share 0.182 0.173
KKS combined download share 0.263* 0.083
Amazon Kindles active user share 0.287* 0.069
KKS active user share 0.361** 0.029
The table shows Pearson correlation coe¢ cients (r):
*Signicant at 0.1; ** Signicant at 0.05.
Scatter plots in Figures 2-5 also provide some suggestive evidence of positive relation-
ships between the English language prociency (as measured by the EPI) and the download
Android or Windows based devices). Specialized e-reading devices (i.e., devices which are nei-
ther phones nor tablet computers and can serve only for reading e-books) are used by only
about 7% of active e-books consumers and that share has recently been steadily declining. See
https://www.statista.com/statistics/326906/worldwide-unit-sales-ereaders/
8We also examined correlations between the EPI and app download and active user shares of the leading
native-language e-reader platforms of domestic origin and found that these correlations have negative (albeit
insignicant) signs.
9SimilarWeb provides access (through a demo platform) to the e-reader app engagement data for 29
countries. But in our estimation of correlations between the EPI and English-language e-reader platforms
market shares, we excluded from that set the data on Japan as we view it as an outlier among countries
with low English language prociency. See more on this in the Appendix.
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and active user market shares of Kindle and KKS even in the data set which includes the
outlier country Japan.
In this paper, we build on a well-known model of two-sided markets (Armstrong, 2006)
to analyze platform competition in a small open economy (i.e., the home country) where the
competing home and foreign platforms bring together content producers (CPs, hereafter)
and consumers. While the home language is used only by domestic CPs and consumers in
the home country, foreign CPs use the foreign language. If a consumer of the home country
is bilingual, she can consume foreign- as well as home-language content. Our baseline model
captures the business models of B-to-C online platforms which charge CPs for access to
the platforms while providing free access to consumers.
Using this framework, we study how platform competition and the amount of content in
the home language are a¤ected by whether consumers of the home country are monolingual
or bilingual. In particular, we address the following questions. Does bilingualism increase
the foreign platforms market share in the home country? Does bilingualism make platform
competition ercer? How does bilingualism a¤ect the amount of home language content
and the domestic welfare? Although we mainly have in mind trade in cultural goods
such as books, songs, and movies, consumption of which involves knowing the language in
which these goods were created, our framework can be applied more generally to trade in
all goods and services (physical or digital) involving information or labeling encoded in a
certain language, which can be a barrier for cross-border transactions.
We assume that the two platforms o¤er a service of the same quality. The main di¤er-
ence between them is that the home platform o¤ers to domestic consumers only access to
home countrys domestic content while the foreign one gives them access to both domestic
and foreign content.10 Since platforms are assumed to o¤er no content translation and only
bilingual domestic consumers can use foreign content, this di¤erence between the platforms
does not matter when consumers are monolingual. However, the di¤erence creates an ad-
vantage for the foreign platform when some or all consumers are bilingual. At the same
time, the foreign platform has a certain disadvantage because we assume that from the
perspective of the bilingual consumers some o¤erings of the foreign country CPs may serve
as direct substitutes for the o¤erings of the domestic country CPs. In other words, when
consumers are bilingual, our assumptions imply that if the platforms have the same mass of
10We make an extreme assumption that the domestic home-country platform (unlike foreign platform) is
monolingual and can o¤er access only to content in the home-country language. In reality, of course, both
home and foreign platforms are bilingual, but all we need for our results to go through is that the foreign
platform has an advantage in providing access to foreign content. One way to capture this comparative
advantage is illustrated below in this paper (see footnote 25 in subsection 2.2).
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consumers, a domestic CP prefers joining the domestic platform to joining the foreign plat-
form; if both platforms have the same mass of domestic CPs, a bilingual consumer prefers
the foreign platform to the domestic platform. The platforms do not charge any price to
consumers but charge subscription fees to CPs. In addition, we assume that consumers
single-home (i.e., use only one platform) while CPs multi-home (i.e., may subscribe to one
or two platforms).
In the paper, we analyze the case in which all consumers are bilingual and compare
it with what happens when all consumers are monolingual. Our rst result is that bilin-
gualism increases the foreign platforms consumer market share. Although this result is
expected, it is not trivial because of opposing e¤ects. Having foreign content on board helps
the foreign platform to attract bilingual consumers. However, as domestic CPs prefer to
avoid competition from foreign CPs, the foreign platform has di¢ culty in attracting do-
mestic CPs, which, in turn, makes it harder to attract consumers. We show that the rst
e¤ect dominates: bilingualism can even lead to a tipping equilibrium in which all domestic
consumers access content through the foreign platform.11
Our second result is that bilingualism softens platform competition, which implies that
it allows each platform to extract more surplus from CPs. This result is based on the
multiplier e¤ect in our model of a two-sided market. Suppose that some consumers switch
from platform 2 to platform 1. This increases the number of CPs subscribed to platform
1 while decreasing the number of CPs subscribed to platform 2, which, in turn, induces
additional consumers to switch from platform 2 to platform 1, and so on. This multiplier
e¤ect increases with each platforms e¢ ciency in matching CPs with consumers. There-
fore, when a platform becomes more e¢ cient, the CPsdemand for platformsmatching
services becomes more elastic and consequently platform competition becomes stronger.
By contrast, platform competition becomes weaker when a platform becomes less e¢ cient.
When consumers are bilingual, substitution between domestic content and foreign con-
tent reduces the value of exchanges between domestic CPs and consumers through the
foreign platform. More precisely, the ability to consume foreign content reduces the mar-
ginal surplus that consumers using the foreign platform obtain from additional domestic
CPs, as well as the marginal surplus that domestic CPs subscribed to the foreign plat-
form obtain from additional consumers. This reduction of the expected interaction surplus
for each side has a similar e¤ect on competition for domestic content as the reduction of
matching e¢ ciency of the foreign platform. Hence, it softens platform competition for the
11In our empirical illustration with the case of e-readers, some countries have no domestic platform




Combining the above two results generates nuanced predictions regarding the impact
of bilingualism on the amount of home language content. Conventional wisdom would
suggest that substitution between foreign language content and home language content
would negatively a¤ect the latter. This would be true in a one-sidedmarket. However, in
a two-sided market, bilingual consumersability to consume foreign content can increase
the amount of home language content per consumer as it increases consumer concentration
in the foreign platform and thereby strengthens the cross-side network externalities. On
the negative side, content substitution, together with the result that bilingualism softens
platform competition, can lead to a reduction in the amount of home language content on
the foreign platform. For instance, we nd that due to the competition-softening e¤ect,
bilingualism always reduces the total mass of domestic content available in either platform.
We show that in general, the welfare e¤ect of bilingualism depends on the weight of
consumer surplus relative to domestic producer surplus (which includes domestic CPs
surplus and the domestic platforms prot). The di¤erence between consumer surplus and
domestic producer surplus can arise because consumers directly benet from foreign content
while domestic CPs may su¤er from it because of substitution between domestic and foreign
content. In addition, the prot of the domestic platform is always lower in the bilingual
case than in the monolingual case. We nd that bilingualism typically increases consumer
surplus but reduces domestic producer surplus in the case of strong content substitution.
In the latter case, bilingualism leads to lower domestic welfare if the relative weight of
domestic producer surplus is large.
Finally, in light of the current debate about the taxation of large (mostly US based)
platforms in OECD countries, we study the e¤ect of a policy imposing a constant per-
CP tax on the foreign platform. We nd that taxing the foreign platform in general
harms consumers and that a small tax reduces the total producer surplus. However, under
certain conditions, a small tax can raise domestic welfare. For instance, when there is
strong substitution between foreign content and domestic content, a small tax has almost
no impact on consumer surplus but the tax revenue is larger than the loss in producer
surplus. When we consider a large tax which signicantly increases the market share of the
domestic platform, we nd that there is a trade-o¤ between smaller consumer surplus and
larger producer surplus. Hence, a large tax raises domestic welfare if the relative weight
of producer surplus is large and the tax increases substantially the domestic platforms
market share.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 reviews the related literature. Section 2
presents our baseline model. Section 3 analyzes the monolingual case and Section 4 analyzes
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the bilingual case and compares it with the monolingual case in terms of the amount of
domestic content. Section 5 performs welfare analysis and Section 6 analyzes taxing the
foreign platform. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix gathers some proofs and extensions.
The online appendix contains analysis of the mixed case in which bilingual consumers and
monolingual consumers coexist.
1.1 Literature review
Our paper builds on the literature on two-sided markets (Caillaud and Jullien, 2001, 2003,
Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006, Anderson and Coate, 2005, Armstrong 2006, Hagiu 2006,
Weyl, 2010).12 Two-sided markets can be roughly dened as industries where platforms
provide intermediation services between two (or several) kinds of users. Typical examples
include dating agencies, payment cards (Rochet and Tirole, 2002), mass media (Anderson
and Coate, 2005), operating systems (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005), video games (Hagiu
2006), academic journals (Jeon and Rochet, 2010) etc. In such industries, it is vital for
platforms to nd a price structure that attracts su¢ cient numbers of users on each side
of the market. Our paper has two novel aspects. First, it is the rst paper that studies
competition among platforms serving as intermediaries in international trade. Second, we
examine how platform competition is a¤ected by trade barriers that arise due to linguistic
di¤erences between buyers and sellers.13
In our model, the language-related trade surplus is formalized in a way that is similar
to Lazear (1999) where individuals are randomly matched and a match generates a surplus
only if the matched individuals share common language. This generates positive network
externalities among individuals using a common language, which is a standard feature of
several recent models of bilingualism.14 However, our framework di¤ers from the previous
models of language or bilingualism in the following two dimensions. First, in our model,
matches occur between two sides of a market: consumers and CPs. A surplus is created
only if a matched pair of a consumer and a CP share common language. Second, matches
12Our model in which we assume single-homing for consumers and multi-homing for CPs is similar to
Anderson and Coate (2005), Armstrong and Wright (2007) and Hagiu (2009).
13Two empirical industrial organization papers (Gandal, 2006, and Viard and Economides, 2015) are
related to our paper since they view the Internet as a two-sided market and study the impact of the on-
line userslanguage heterogeneity on their demand for accessing foreign (mainly English language) digital
content.
14For example, Church and King (1993) study each individuals choice to become bilingual and Ortega
and Tangeras (2008) analyze the politically dominant groups choice between unilingual and bilingual
education. An excellent overview of the literature on bilingualism and a novel economics analylsis of
languages is provided in Ginsburgh and Weber (2011).
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are mediated by competing platforms.
This paper is also related to the international economics literature that emphasizes the
role played by information networks in facilitating international trade. While the signi-
cance of traditional barriers to trade has been declining over time, barriers and frictions
related to incomplete or asymmetric information with regard to trading opportunities in
foreign markets remain substantial (Portes and Rey, 2005). Among the sources of these
information-related costs of cross-border transactions are linguistic and cultural di¤erences
between the transacting parties. One of the traditional means of overcoming these sort
of trade costs has been information networks of internationally dispersed ethnic diasporas,
sharing the same language and databases of business contacts, which can be viewed as
precursors of modern e-commerce platforms.15 The importance of common language has
also been emphasized in the literature which uses the gravity model of international trade
to show that immigrants promote trade with their country of origin (see Gould, 1994, Head
and Ries, 1998 and Wagner et al. 2002).16
Several authors have analyzed cross-border e-commerce using di¤erent versions of the
gravity model which typically includes an explanatory variable capturing trade costs caused
by language barriers (e.g., Blum and Glodfarb, 2006, Hortaçsu et al., 2009, Lendl et al.,
2012, and Martens and Turlea, 2012). Most of these papers conrm that as the impor-
tance of geographical distance-related trade costs decreases, other types of transaction costs
become more prominent in online trade, in particular costs related to language barriers.
While there is a substantial empirical literature studying online international trade, we
are aware of only a few recent papers that consider formal models for analyzing the cross-
border distribution of cultural goods, including audio and visual artwork and programming
by means of radio, TV broadcasting and the Internet streaming. For example, Richardson
(2006) and Richardson and Wilkie (2015) analyze the e¤ects of cultural and local music
quotas in the context of commercial radio broadcasting of playlists, which mix domestic
and foreign content. However, these papers employ models which are very di¤erent from
ours and do not rely on two-sided markets interpretation of online intermediaries.17
15Rauch (1999) shows that trade networks based on family ties, colonial ties or a common language are
important in explaining trade patterns, especially for di¤erentiated goods that do not have reference prices.
16A somewhat broader literature emphasizes the importance of ethnic and linguistic commonalities be-
tween countries for facilitating their international trade (see Melitz, 2008, and Melitz and Toubal, 2014.)
See Egger and Lassmann (2012) for a meta-analysis of the common language e¤ect on trade.
17More generally, trade in cultural goods was analyzed in Francois and van Ypersele (2002), Bala and
Long (2005), Janeba (2007), Olivier et al. (2008), Rauch and Trindade (2009), Disdier et al. (2010 a,




We build on a well-known analysis of two-sided markets (Armstrong, 2006) to analyze
platform competition in a small open economy (the home country) and introduce common
language as a necessary condition for an interaction between two sides (i.e., consumers
and CPs). There are two languages: home language and foreign language. The home
language is only spoken by consumers of the home country while the foreign language is
used abroad and by bilingual consumers of the home country. We assume that all CPs in
the home country have their content in the home language, and refer to them as domestic
CPs. We view a platform as an intermediary between consumers and CPs and focus on
the competition between two platforms, indexed by i = 1 or 2, within the home country.18
Platform 1 is assumed to be foreign and has both domestic and foreign content while
platform 2 is domestic and has only domestic content.19 Let  2 [0; 1] be the proportion
of bilingual consumers in the home country. The case of  = 0 is called the monolingual
case, that of  = 1 the bilingual one and that of  2 (0; 1) the mixed one. We focus on the
monolingual and the bilingual cases; the mixed case is analyzed in the online Appendix.20
2.1 Platforms, CPs and consumers
The general structure of the model is the following. In the home country, there are a mass
one of consumers and a mass m (> 0) of CPs whose content is already produced and can be
18By ignoring the domestic market in the foreign country we focus on one of the two national markets.
Thus, our paper is a rst step toward studying a fully reciprocal model of international trade in con-
tent mediated by platforms competing in the two national markets. Empirically such a reciprocal digital
trade environment was already investigated in Aguiar and Waldfogel (2018) who analyzed and compared
theatrical versus Netix distribution of lms into 56 countries.
19Our analysis can also be extended to the case in which both platforms have domestic and foreign
content but di¤er in their coverage of foreign language content. See footnote 25.
20In an interior equilibrium of the mixed case without substitution between foreign language and home
language content, as  increases, the foreign platforms market share increases not only among bilingual
consumers but also among monolingual consumers. Its share among monolingual consumers increases due
to the indirect network e¤ect: the increase in the proportion of bilingual consumers induces more domestic
CPs to join the foreign platform, which, in turn, allows it to attract even more monolingual consumers.
Therefore, as  increases, the amount of domestic content increases in the foreign platform while it decreases
by the same amount in the domestic platform. However, the overall amount of domestic content available
per consumer increases with  because of the two-sided externality between consumers and CPs. For this
reason, we nd that both the domestic consumer surplus and the domestic CPssurplus increase with  and
that the increase in CPssurplus dominates the reduction in the domestic platforms prot if the amount
of foreign content is large enough. In this case, a proactive policy promoting bilingualism is benecial to
consumers and domestic producers.
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made available on a platform.21 For any given pair of a consumer and a domestic CP that
are active on platform i, we assume that the interaction between them generates a surplus
of ai > 0 to the consumer and a surplus of bi > 0 to the CP. Some foreign content may
be substituted for home content so that the values ai and bi may depend on the foreign
content available on platform i.
We view ai as the increase in expected surplus per consumer generated by an additional
domestic CP in platform i, which is the product of the (additional) probability that the
CPs content is matched to a consumer and the expected surplus conditional on the match.
bi is the expected prot of a domestic CP per consumer on platform i, which is the product
of the probability of the match between a consumer and the CP and the expected prot
conditional on the match. In the next subsection, we explain how bilingualism and foreign
content a¤ect ai and bi.
Following Armstrong (2006), we consider horizontally-di¤erentiated platforms and as-
sume that consumers are uniformly distributed on the Hotelling interval between zero and
one. We assume that a consumers location on the Hotelling line is independently distrib-
uted of the consumers language skill. Platform 1 (2) is located at zero (one). A consumer
derives utility from a platforms basic service and from access to the CPs subscribed to the
platform, net of the transportation cost. We assume that the values of basic services u1
and u2 are large enough such that every consumer ends up using one of the two platforms.
Consumers single-home, that is they subscribe to only one platform.
In terms of pricing, we assume that platforms do not charge any price to consumers
while each platform i = 1; 2 charges a subscription fee Fi to CPs. For instance, in the case
of Amazon, the platform charges professional sellers $ 39.99 for monthly subscription in
addition to charges per item sold (such as referral and closing fees).22 In Jeon, Jullien and
Klimenko (2018), we consider various alternative business models and show the robustness
of our results to di¤erent assumptions about platformspricing structures.
CPs multi-home as long as this gives them a higher prot than single-homing. In
order to make its content available on a platform, a CP should incur a xed cost that is
uniformly distributed over the interval [0; 1=f ] ; where we normalize f = 1 for expositional
simplicity.23 We assume that the highest cost/benet ratio is large enough that there are
21Jeon, Jullien and Klimenko (2018) provides an extension of this model, in which the amount of home
language content is endogenous.
22See http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=200306550
23The cost of making content available in a platform is non-negligible and distinct from the cost of
producing content (which can also be distributed through o­ ine channels such as TV, radio, print and
removable storage media.) For instance, Bresnahan et als. (2015) explain tipping out of small platforms
for mobile apps in the US by decisions of owners of attractive applications not to make them available in
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always CPs who decide not to join any platform, which holds if bi is not too large.24
Platform i chooses Fi to maximize its prot i = Fini, where ni is the mass of domestic
CPs on platform i: Bilingualism and foreign content a¤ect the outcome of competition by
changing the values of ui; ai and bi:
2.2 Language and exchanges
Monolingual consumers can access only home language CPs. We assume that the transla-
tion service is imperfect; hence the foreign platform does not provide translation services
that would expand the supply to foreign content. We assume that with respect to mono-
lingual consumers, both platforms are equally e¢ cient: the value of basic service as well as
the values of interactions are the same for both platforms (u1 = u2 = u, a1 = a2 = a and
b1 = b2 = b):
Consider now bilingual consumers. Given that platform 2 o¤ers only home language
content, the utility parameters are unchanged for this platform: (u2; a2; b2) = (u; a; b)
regardless of whether consumers are bilingual or monolingual.
As for platform 1; let nf > 0 be the measure of the foreign language content that is
available on the platform and is relevant to consumers of the home country. By "relevant"
we mean that consumers of the home country have demand for that content and are able
to obtain it at a negligible transaction cost if they are willing to. For instance, if content is
not free and cross-border online transactions are subject to heavy tari¤s and/or non-tari¤
trade barriers, nf is small even if the measure of foreign language CPs accessible through
platform 1 is large. Similarly, if the home countrys economic and cultural background
di¤ers substantially from that of the foreign country, nf is small.25 We regard nf as
an exogenous parameter, which is justied by our assumption that the home country is
su¢ ciently small that it cannot inuence the presence of foreign language content on the
foreign platform.26
We assume that there is some substitution between foreign language content and home
language content for bilingual consumers. More precisely, we assume that among all pairs
of home language and foreign language content producers, a fraction 2 of them propose
content which is very similar albeit conveyed in di¤erent languages. In that case a bilingual
small platforms even if they are available in the major platforms.
24A su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition is bi  1:
25If platform 2 provides some access to foreign language content, we can dene nfi as each platforms
mass of "relevant" foreign language CPs and consider nf = nf1   n
f
2 > 0.
26Viard and Economides (2013) make a similar assumption that content creation by "large" countries is
exogenous to adoption in "small" countries and nd empirical support for it.
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consumer would interact with only one of the two CPs while a monolingual consumer would
interact with the domestic CP.27 As a consequence given n1 amount of home language
content and nf amount of foreign language content, the total amount of content consumed
by each bilingual consumer of platform 1 is n1 + nf   2n1nf where  > 0 is a parameter
of substitution. As the total amount of content should increase in each element of (n1; nf ),
we introduce the following assumption.
Assumption A1: 1=2 > nf ; 1 > 2bm:
The rst part of A1 is simply equivalent to n1 > 2nfn1, which must hold obviously.
The second part of A1 ensures that condition nf > 2nfn1 holds in equilibrium. As for nf ,
parameter  should be higher if the home countrys socioeconomic and cultural background
is similar to that of the foreign country. For instance, if the foreign country is the U.S.,
we expect a high  when the home country is located in western Europe or Latin America
and a low  when it is located in Asia.
We further assume that when some mutually substitutable content is o¤ered both in the
home and the foreign language, a bilingual consumer interacts with either content with the
same probability.28 Therefore, among the total of n1 + nf   2n1nf interactions mediated
by platform 1, there are n1   n1nf in the home language and nf   n1nf in the foreign
language.
Given the values a and b per interaction, a bilingual consumers total utility on platform
1 is u + a(n1 + nf   2n1nf ) and a domestic CPs surplus per consumer on platform 1 is
b(1  nf ); which translate into new values of u1; a1 and b1 for the foreign platform. The
next table summarizes our assumptions on the benets of interactions between consumers
and CPs.29 For tractability of the model, we assume that neither ai nor bi depends on
the supply of home language content on platform i.30 Our model thus abstracts from
price competition between domestic content producers that would make transaction surplus
27For instance, each consumer searching on the foreign platform may draw at random some content, which
satises her needs. The search may be assumed to be such that it results with some positive probability
in nding substantively the same content available in both domestic and foreign language. When this
happens, the fully bilingual consumer may be equally likely to choose any one of the two language o¤erings
of the same content.
28This tie-breaking assumption is for simplicity only and our results hold no matter the tie-breaking
assumption as long as nf > 0. See the footnote right after Proposition 2.
29We should point out here that this representation is valid also if bilingual consumers obtain a utility
uB 6= u at platform 1 provided that we redene nf as ~nf = uB ua + n
f and adjust the value of  to
~~nf = nf :
30Jeon, Jullien and Klimenko (2018) analyzes a formal search model to show how to derive the values ai
and bi:
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endogenous. However our model can accommodate some form of non-price competition.
In particular, substitution of home content by foreign content reduces the values ai and
bi by a factor proportional to the volume of foreign content available on platform i. In
addition, our model can be reinterpreted to accommodate substitution among o¤erings of
home language CPs (see the Appendix).
Table 1: surplus parameters (ui; ai; bi) in each platform
Platform 1 Platform 2
monolingual consumers (u; a; b) (u; a; b)
bilingual consumers
 




; b(1  nf )

(u; a; b)
Hence, in platform 1, bilingualism increases the stand-alone utility by anf and reduces
the indirect network e¤ect by a factor 2nf for consumers and nf for domestic CPs.
From the specication of our model, we obtain the following demand systems. Platform
1s consumer market share in the monolingual case, denoted xM1 ; and the one in the bilingual



















where we use superscript M (B) to denote the monolingual (bilingual) case.
The domestic platforms consumer market share is then xM2 = 1  xM1 and xB2 = 1  xB1









(1  )xM2 + xB2

 mF2: (4)
(2) and (3) show that for given allocation of domestic CPs, the presence of foreign
content boosts bilingual consumersparticipation to the foreign platform while for given
allocation of consumers, it hinders domestic CPsparticipation to the foreign platform for
any  > 0.
The timing of the game we consider is the following:
 Stage 1: Each platform i for i = 1; 2 simultaneously chooses the subscription fee Fi
for domestic CPs.
 Stage 2: After observing (F1; F2), domestic CPs make decisions to subscribe to plat-
form 1 and/or platform 2.
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 Stage 3: After observing (n1; n2), each consumer decides which platform to use.
Notice that consumers observe the volume of content on each platform when deciding
which to join. The CPs however need to form expectation about each platforms consumer
market share to decide whether to pay a fee or not.
3 Monolingual consumers
Consider the case in which all consumers are monolingual (i.e.,  = 0). As a consequence,
there is no international trade except for the "cross-border" provision of the intermediation
service by the foreign platform for the domestic consumers and CPs in the home country.
Given symmetric parameters (u; a; b) ; the gross utility di¤erential between platform 1
and platform 2 is a (n1   n2). At stage 2, one point increase in a platforms anticipated
consumer market share raises its CP demand by mb. We assume the following stability
condition, which is standard in the two-sided market literature:
Assumption A2: t > abm.
The reason for the assumption is the following. Suppose that an exogenous shock in-
creases the mass of consumers on platform 1 by " > 0 (without a¤ecting x2). Then, from
(3), the mass of subscribed CPs increases by bm" on platform 1. This induces (from (1))
a mass of abm"=2t extra consumers to switch from platform 2 to platform 1. This in turn
increases (from (3)) n1 by ab2 (m)
2 "=2t and reduces (from (4)) n2 by ab2 (m)
2 "=2t, which
induces (from (1)) an additional increase in platform 1s consumer share by (abm)2 "=2t2
etc. If A2 is not satised, the mass of these extra consumers who switch later is larger
than the mass of consumers who originally switched, which makes the system explode. If
it holds, the total increase in x1 is equal to [1 + M ]" where
M  abm
2t  2abm (5)
is the positive multiplier in our two-sided market for the monolingual case. Note that an
increase in (a; b;m) and a reduction in t strengthen the positive feedback in the two-sided
market and thereby increase the multiplier.
In the monolingual case, the consumer market share of platform 1 is given by (1). From











  M(Fi   Fj
b
): (7)
Platform is prot is given by i = Fini. Using (7) into (6), i is maximized at a price such






for i = 1; 2: (8)
Condition (8) shows that in any shared equilibrium in which each platform has a positive
consumer market share, a platform captures a share of the surplus generated by a CP
subscribed to its platform that is constant and the same for both platforms. In particular,
as M increases, the platformsshare decreases. Therefore, we can consider M a measure
of platform competition in the monolingual case. The stronger is competition between the
two platforms, the smaller is the share of the surplus captured by the platforms. This
measure of platform competition increases with each element in (a; b;m) and decreases in
t, which is very intuitive as an increase in (a; b;m) strengthens the positive feedback in the
two-sided market.






, for i = 1; 2; (9)





is a CPs share in the surplus.
We have:
Proposition 1 (monolingual case): Consider the case in which all consumers are mono-
lingual. Under Assumption A2, we have a unique equilibrium, which involves two symmetric
active platforms.







for i = 1; 2:
(b) The equilibrium outcome is described by:
xMi = x












for i = 1; 2:
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Proof. See Appendix.
In reality, some foreign content can be translated into the home language. In the case
of books, for instance, translated content is produced by domestic CPs who pay copyright
fees and royalties to the foreign CPs owning the original content. Therefore, translated
content becomes part of home language content. One way to include such a translation
in our model is by assuming that the mass of home language content which is already
produced and can be made available on a platform is increased from m to m0(> m), where
the di¤erence m0   m increases with nf and decreases with the cost of translation. This
will lead to the symmetric equilibrium described in Proposition 1 in which m is replaced by
m0. As our monolingual case (i.e., the symmetric equilibrium with m) captures the worst
case scenario with the innite cost of translation, if bilingualism leads to a reduction in
home language content or the domestic welfare, the same conclusion will hold a fortiori
when translation is taken into account in the monolingual case.
4 Bilingual consumers
In this section, we study the case in which all consumers are bilingual (i.e.,  = 1) and
contrast the bilingual case with the monolingual case. We assume nf > 0 in order to study
how substitution between foreign and home language content a¤ects the market outcome.
In the bilingual case, we study both the interior equilibrium where each platform is active
and the cornering equilibrium where the foreign platform monopolizes the market.
4.1 Equilibrium of the bilingual case
We here study equilibrium of the bilingual case. We rst dene a parameter   which
measures the reduction in the e¢ ciency of the exchanges in the home language within
platform 1 due to the substitution between home language content and foreign language
content:
Denition 1    1  (1  nf )(1  2nf ).
In the absence of the substitution between home language content and foreign language
content, the e¢ ciency of exchanges in the home language within each platform can be
measured by ab. From Table 1, the substitution between home language content and
foreign language content reduces the surplus that a domestic CP obtains from having an
additional consumer from b to b(1   nf ) and the surplus that a consumer obtains from
having an additional domestic CP from a to a(1 2nf ). Therefore, the e¢ ciency measure
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of exchanges in the home language within platform 1 becomes ab (1   ) and is reduced by
ab . Under Assumption A1 that nf 2 [0; 1=2), we have   2 [0; 1) and   strictly increases
with nf .
Platform 1s share of bilingual consumers xBi is given by (2). From (3) and (4), the
mass of CPs joining platform i is given by
nB1 = mbx
B


































We call B the multiplier in the bilingual case. To understand its meaning, consider a
reduction in F2 by " > 0. This raises the CPs on platform 2 by m", which in turn increases
xB2 by am"=(2t), which reduces the CP participation on platform 1 by am
2b(1 nf )"=(2t)
and increases the CP on platform 2 by am2b"=(2t). This in turn increases xB2 by a
2m2b(2 
 )"=(2t)2 etc. Hence, the total increase in xB2 is 
B=b. Note also that cB1 > 1=2 under
Assumption A1.
Under bilingualism two types of equilibrium may exist: in a shared equilibrium, both
platforms are active while in a tipping equilibrium, platforms 2 is not selling. We examine
both types of equilibrium in turn.
Shared equilibrium
We rst study the shared equilibrium in which both platforms are active. From (10),
(11) and (12), by maximizing i = Fini, we obtain the equilibrium price conditions:
F1
xB1 (1  nf )b
=
1







The domestic platforms share in the surplus generated by domestic CPs takes the same
form as in the monolingual case, but for the relevant multiplier B: For   > 0, the share
of a CPs surplus retained by the foreign platform is higher than what is retained by the
domestic platform. The reason is that the perceived price elasticity is lower for the foreign
platform, due to lower intensity of indirect network e¤ects.
Moreover, we have:
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Proposition 2 (competition softening e¤ect): Suppose that Assumptions A1 and A2 hold.
Then, bilingualism softens platform competition:
B < M for   > 0 and B = M for   = 0:
Proof. The proof is omitted as it follows from the discussion in the main text.
As a consequence, both platforms retain a higher share of CPs surplus than in the
monolingual case. As we previously explained, due to the substitution between home lan-
guage content and foreign language content, exchanges in the foreign language come with
the drawback of making exchanges in the home language less valuable in platform 1. More
precisely, the e¢ ciency measure of exchanges in the home language within platform 1 is
reduced by ab . This change in platform 1s perceived e¢ ciency for domestic CPs has
spillover to the other platform since the multiplier in our two-sided market depends on the
sum of the e¢ ciency measures of each platform. In particular, bilingualism softens platform
competition by reducing the multiplier compared with the monolingual case.31
Substituting the prices in (12) with the expressions from (14) gives the equilibrium











Therefore, there is no equilibrium in which platform 2 corners the market. Notice also that
holding   and B1 constant, x
B
1 increases linearly with the stock n
f of foreign content on
the platform (as cB1 does so).
The existence of the shared equilibrium requires xB1  1 for platform 2 to be active,










2 + B(1   )

: (16)
We show in the Appendix that for a given ; this condition holds if the mass of foreign
language is below a threshold nf dened as
nf  max

nf j nf  1=(2) and (16) holds
	
:
31For this reason, Proposition 2 holds no matter the tie-breaking rule applied to mutually substitutable
content. This is because bilingualism always strictly reduces a1 and weakly reduces b1. For a similar
reason, if we assume, in addition to the substitution between o¤erings of foreign and domestic CPs, the
substitution among the o¤erings of domestic CPs, our main result will not be a¤ected. Although adding
such substitution reduces the multiplier both in the monolingual and the bilingual cases, the result that
the presence of the substitution between domestic and foreign content o¤erings makes the multiplier in the
bilingual case smaller than the one in the monolingual case remains intact (see the Appendix).
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Notice that it is possible that nf is equal to the maximal level 1=(2).
Tipping equilibrium
We have seen above that there is no equilibrium in which platform 2 corners the market.
However, there can be an equilibrium in which platform 2 is not active. When xB1 = 1,
the mass of CPs on platform 1 is m
 
(1  nf )b  F1

so that platform 1s prot, 1 =










where the superscript t means tipping. This is an equilibrium if platform 2 cannot attract
any consumers and therefore any CPs by charging F2 = 0: Hence, we have such a cornering
equilibrium with a monopoly price, if at prices (F t1; F2 = 0), platform 2 does not sell, which























One can verify that 0 < nf < nf holds for   2 [0; 1) (provided nf < 1=(2)). As should
be expected, for nf between nf and nf ; the market tips but the presence of platform 2
constrains the pricing of the foreign platform. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 3 (bilingual case): Suppose that Assumptions A1 and A2 hold. When all
consumers are bilingual, we have a unique equilibrium.
(i) If nf < nf , then the equilibrium is a shared equilibrium and we have:
FB1 =
xB1 (1  nf )b











1 (1  nf )

1 + B(1   )
2 + B(1   )








where the foreign platforms market share xB1 is given by (15).
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(ii) If nf > nf , then the equilibrium is such that platform 1 corners the market and




(iii) If nf < nf  nf , then the equilibrium is such that platform 1 corners the market
and charges a price below the monopoly price.32
Proof. See Appendix.
4.2 Comparison with the monolingual case: home language con-
tent
In this subsection, we compare the monolingual case and the bilingual one in terms of
the amount of home language content available on the platforms. The amount of home
language content available on each platform depends on the consumer market shares, the
amount crowded out by foreign content and the intensity of competition.
Let us rst examine the consumer market shares. We nd that the foreign platforms
market share is always higher in the bilingual case than in the monolingual case.
Proposition 4 (consumer market share) Under Assumptions A1 and A2, bilingualism
(i.e.,  = 1) increases the consumer market share of the foreign platform relative to the




Bilingualism has three e¤ects in our model. First the foreign platform becomes more
attractive to consumers who value the foreign content. Second, for given consumer market
share, the foreign platform becomes less attractive to domestic CPs due to competition
with substitute foreign content. Third, lower indirect network e¤ects reduce the intensity
of competition and raises more the prices on the foreign platform than on the domestic
platform. The proposition shows that the rst e¤ect dominates the last two. However, the
last two e¤ects mitigate the increase of the foreign platforms market share.
We can now examine how bilingualism a¤ects the amount of home language content
available in the Internet. We rst nd that bilingualism reduces the total amount of home
language content measured by n1 + n2. Consider the shared equilibrium. Then for   > 0,








32At nf = nf ; the equilibrium is cornered if nf < 1=2 and shared if nf = 1=2:
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This result is due to the fact that bilingualism reduces platform competition and that
competition from foreign CPs lowers the expected surplus of domestic CPs in the foreign
platform. The same result holds in the tipping equilibrium as platform 1 charges a higher
price than the price it charges in the shared equilibrium with xB1 ' 1.33
We now examine the amount of content in each platform. Consider rst the shared
equilibrium. The fact that bilingualism softens competition together with the fact that
bilingualism reduces the domestic platforms market share implies that bilingualism reduces
the amount of home language content on this platform. Bilingualism increases the market
share of the foreign platform, which will attract more domestic CPs unless the larger market
share is o¤set by the price increase and the substitution with foreign content. Thus we nd
that bilingualism reduces the amount of home language content on the foreign platform
when its consumer market share is not very large or when the degree of substitution between
domestic and foreign content is high.
Consider now the monopoly tipping equilibrium. On the one hand, domestic CPs
capture a smaller share of surplus in the bilingual case than in the monolingual case because
of the monopoly power of the platform. On the other hand, the mass of consumers is twice
larger in the foreign platform under bilingualism than the mass in each platform under
monolingualism. This can increase the mass of CPs subscribed to the bilingual platform
because of economies of scale in the interactions between consumers and CPs (i.e., due to
the cross-side network externality in this two-sided market). We nd again that the mass




=2 is smaller than nM if and only if




Since the right hand side of (19) increases with t, when there is little di¤erentiation of
service o¤ered by the platforms and a high degree of substitution between the foreign
language and the home language content, the price increase by the foreign platform more
than o¤sets the increase in its consumer market share. As a result, bilingualism reduces the
amount of content in the home language in the foreign platform. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 5 (home language content): Suppose Assumptions A1 and A2 and nf > 0.
33If the foreign platform is exogenously much more e¢ cient at matching consumers and content providers,
bilingualism is more likely to increase the aggregate supply of domestic content. Moreover, it is more likely
that a monopoly tipping equilibrium emerges under bilingualism. As this equilibrium involves an additional
distortion from the exercise of monopoly power, for high degree of substitution, the relationship between
the total amount of domestic content under bilingualism and the e¢ ciency level of the foreign platform
may not be monotonic.
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(i) Bilingualism (i.e.,  = 1) always reduces the total amount of home language content






2 ) and the amount of content available on the domestic platform
(i.e., nM2 > n
B
2 ) relative to the monolingual case.
(ii) In the shared equilibrium, bilingualism raises the amount of home language content
available on the foreign platform relative to the monolingual case if nf is small and reduces
it if nf is large. In the tipping equilibrium, bilingualism reduces the amount of content
available on the foreign platform if and only if (19) holds.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, a key determinant of whether bilingualism increases or reduces the amount of
home language content available on the foreign platform is the extent of substitution be-
tween foreign and home content measured by nf or  .
5 Welfare analysis
In this section, we study how bilingualism a¤ects the welfare of the home country.34 Before
proceeding to welfare comparison, we show a result that facilitates it.
In the Appendix, we show that we can normalize the model, without loss of generality,
by setting parameters a = b = m = 1 and scaling the amount of content by a factor
1=bm: In the normalized model, we use the notation enf = nf=bm to denote the normalized
quantity of foreign content. We then dene CS(enf ; ) as the consumer surplus (net of the
stand-alone value u) in a model with a = b = m = 1 and foreign content enf : We similarly
dene d(enf ; ) as the normalized domestic producer surplus, which is the sum of the prot
of the domestic platform and the prots of domestic CPs. Then, as shown in the Appendix,
the domestic welfare in the original model can be written as
W = u+ abm

CS(enf ; ) + b
a
d(enf ; ) : (20)
Therefore, comparing bilingual welfare with monolingual welfare is equivalent to comparing
CS(enf ; ) + (b=a)d(enf ; ) with CS(0; 0) + (b=a)d(0; 0) where b=a > 0 is the relative
weight of the producer surplus in the domestic welfare. In other words, in the welfare
34A similar analysis would hold for world welfare. Under our small country assumption, bilingualism
allows foreign CPs to sell content to domestic consumers. Therefore, bilingualism raises the joint prot
of the foreign platform and the foreign CPs. Hence, world welfare increases whenever domestic welfare
increases.
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comparison, without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to the weighted sum of the
consumer surplus and the producer surplus in the normalized model.35
In what follows, our discussion is focused on the e¤ect of bilingualism on consumer
surplus and producer surplus in the normalized model. Assuming a = b = m = 1, the
assumption A1 becomes 1 > 2nf and 1 > 2 while the assumption A2 becomes t > 1:
The consumer surplus is










2 + (1  x1)2

; (21)
while the domestic producer surplus is
d(n






Consider the case of no substitution between home language and foreign language con-
tent (i.e.,  =   = 0). First, if there is market sharing, the intensity of competition is
unchanged (B = M) so that bilingualism improves the o¤er of platform 1 without af-
fecting the price (per consumer) that each platform levies on domestic CPs. Platform 1s
consumer market share and mass of CPs increase, while the reverse holds for platform 2.
Overall consumers collectively benet from platform 1s higher supply of content. Similarly
bilingualism raises CPssurplus because they benet from economies of scale in the inter-
actions with consumers. However, the aggregate e¤ect on the domestic producer surplus
is ambiguous since bilingualism reduces platform 2s prot. We nd that there is a cuto¤
such that bilingualism increases the domestic producer surplus if and only if nF is above
the cuto¤.
Consider now the case of substitution between domestic and foreign content (i.e.,  > 0).
Consider rst the polar case in which nf is close to 1=2 (hence,   ' 1) still with market
sharing. In this case, nf > 1=2 from A1 and t > nf from (15) and xB1 < 1. According
to Proposition 5, domestic CP participation is lower on each platform under bilingualism
than in the monolingual case. Hence domestic producer surplus is lower. Moreover, due
35Our model captures some important asymmetries between consumers and content producers in the way
they benet from online matches, which have implications for the relative weight of the producer surplus,
b=a. First, the asymmetry between consumers and producers in terms of how they use "online platforms" is
captured in our model by the assumption of single-homing consumers and multi-homing producers which is
known as competitive bottleneck in the industrial organization literature. Under a competitive bottleneck,
platforms tend to extract surplus from multi-homers and dissipate it to attract single-homers. This tends
to increase b=a but in an endogenous way which is captured by our analysis to some extent. Second,
the degree of competition among producers will surely a¤ect b=a. The stronger is competition among
producers, the lower will be b=a.
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to lower participation of CPs, the consumer surplus generated by platform 2 is also lower.
But given that nf (> 1=2) > nM , bilingualism increases the consumer surplus generated by
platform 1. The overall e¤ect on consumer surplus then depends on the amount of foreign
content.
Consider now the case in which bilingualism leads to the tipping equilibrium with the
monopoly price. Then, we can show that bilingualism always increases consumer surplus
because the increase in the total amount of content (including nf) exceeds the increase
in total transportation cost. CPssurplus may increase or decrease depending on nf as
the concentration of consumers in the foreign platform allows CPs to avoid duplication of
xed cost. A su¢ cient condition for bilingualism to reduce the producer surplus is that it














4t  3 : (23)
This condition is always satised if t is close to one: when there is little di¤erentiation of
service o¤ered by the platforms, bilingualism always reduces producer surplus if it leads
to the tipping equilibrium. Hence, if (23) holds, there is a conict between the consumer
surplus and the producer surplus e¤ects and bilingualism reduces domestic welfare if b=a
is large enough.
Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 6 (domestic welfare): (i) When  = 0, in any shared equilibrium, bilingual-
ism increases consumer surplus and domestic CPssurplus. It increases domestic producer
surplus if nf is larger than a threshold.
(ii) When  > 0 is close to 1=(2nf ) (i.e.,   ' 1), in a shared equilibrium, bilingual-
ism reduces domestic producer surplus relative to the monolingual case while it increases
consumer surplus if nf is large enough.
(iii) When bilingualism leads to the tipping equilibrium with the monopoly price, it
always increases consumer surplus relative to the monolingual case. It reduces domestic
producer surplus if condition (23) holds.
Proof. See Appendix
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6 Foreign platform taxation
Let us study how taxing the foreign platform a¤ects domestic welfare in the bilingual case.
We consider a xed per-CP tax on the foreign platform such that the prot of the foreign
platform is 1 = n1(F1   ) and the tax revenue is T = n1: The prot function of the
domestic platform is given as before 2 = n2F2. Without loss of generality, we consider
the normalized model a = b = m = 1. From normalization we obtain the total domestic
welfare
W = u+ abm

CS(enf ; ) + b
a





where ~T is the revenue from the (normalized) tax in the normalized model.




t+ nf   1  F1(1  2nf ) + F2

where the multiplier is B  1= (2t  (2   )) :
The new rst-order condition for optimality of the price of platform i given a tax  on
the foreign platform is now
F1 =
xB1 (1  nf )
B(1   ) + 2 +  and F2 =
(1  xB1 )
2 + B
; where  =
B(1   ) + 1
B(1   ) + 2 : (24)
 is CPsshare in the surplus generated by CPs subscribed to platform 1 (see (14)). It is
interesting to note that the pass-through rate is just equal to . The fact that  increases
with B (hence decreases with t) and decreases with   plays an important role on the result
we present later. (24) leads to the following equilibrium consumer market share of platform
1:
xB1 =














We see that the tax reduces the market share of the foreign platform among consumers,
which is due to a price increase on the content side that induces a reduction of the par-




xB1 (1  nf )  

;
which is clearly decreasing with the tax. The larger price of the foreign platform together
with larger participation of consumers to the domestic platform allows the latter to benet






Thus without surprise a tax on the foreign platform hurts the activity of the foreign
platform and raises all prices:




< 0, 0 < dF1
d












Let us now analyze the welfare e¤ect of a tax levied on the foreign platform. We provide
in Appendix the detailed formulas for three cases of interest (no or large substitution, and
almost tipping) and here describe only the e¤ects. The e¤ect of the tax on consumer
surplus can be decomposed into three parts. The rst part is the e¤ect of the shift of
participation from the foreign platform to the domestic platform (i.e., the reduction in
xB1 ) on consumption surplus. This e¤ect may be positive or negative as it reects the
change in relative attractiveness of the two platforms. The second e¤ect is the change in
transport costs which is positive because the allocation becomes more symmetric. Finally
the tax raises the price of the platforms inducing a reduction of the supply of content which
hurts consumers. Despite the existence of conicting e¤ects, in two among the three cases
examined we nd that a small tax reduces consumer surplus. However when there is a
large substitution between home and foreign language, consumers are not a¤ected by the
supply of home language content on the foreign platform and therefore are indi¤erent to a
marginal tax.
The domestic producer surplus is composed of two components: the domestic platform
prot and the domestic CP surplus. Clearly the domestic platform benets from the tax.
The e¤ect on domestic CP is not straightforward because their participation decreases on
the foreign platform but increases on the domestic platform. However in all cases examined
we nd that the reduction of the domestic CP surplus on the foreign platform outweighs
the benets that the tax induces on the domestic platform. Thus the e¤ect on domestic
CP surplus is negative and of larger magnitude than the positive e¤ect on the domestic
platform.
It is also interesting to evaluate the gain in terms of tax revenues. For our decomposition
of welfare, it would be meaningless to compare the reduction of consumer surplus with the
revenue in the normalized model because it depends on the relative weight a=b: But it
is interesting to see whether the tax revenue is larger or smaller than the e¤ect on the
domestic content producer surplus. In the next proposition we identify cases where the
gain of revenue is large enough that a small tax raises total domestic welfare.
The next proposition formalizes this discussion.
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Proposition 7 Consider the bilingual case (i.e.,  = 1) and assume that platform 2 is
active in equilibrium. Then a small tax on the foreign platform has the following e¤ects:
(i) If  = 0 or xB1 is close to 1; then it reduces consumer surplus and domestic producers
surplus. The reduction of the domestic producer surplus is less than the tax revenue if B is
small.
(ii) If 1 ' 2nF ; then it has no e¤ect on consumer surplus and it reduces domestic
producer surplus by an amount smaller than the tax revenue. Hence total domestic welfare
increases.
Proof. See Appendix
The case  = 0 is the case where the foreign platforms o¤ering of foreign language
content brings large value to both consumers and domestic content producers. It is thus
not surprising that a tax on the foreign platform hurts welfare. The same holds when the
market share of the foreign platform is large. However, if B is small, which corresponds to
high di¤erentiation between platforms, the tax revenue o¤sets the loss of producer surplus.
If in addition a=b is small so that consumer surplus is low, a small tax raises total welfare.
The case 1 ' 2nF is interesting because in this case due to strong substitution, addi-
tional domestic CPs have almost no impact on the consumer surplus in the foreign platform.
Therefore, consumers on platform 1 are not interested in having domestic content so that
the tax has little e¤ect on them although domestic CPs are able to sell on this platform.
In this case the tax revenue is relatively large and the e¤ect on domestic CPs is relatively
small. Then a small tax is welfare improving. Hence, a small tax may be considered by the
domestic tax authority if foreign content crowds out domestic content or if there is enough
di¤erentiation between the platforms and the weight given to consumer surplus is relatively
small compared to domestic producer surplus and public funds.
While a small tax seems to improve welfare only if there is a strong substitution between
home and foreign language content, this doesnt preclude a large tax to have a positive
impact on welfare. To see that consider the case where xB1 t 1 (but is interior) without









: Now suppose that with a tax, the government succeeds
in raising signicantly the market share xB2 of the domestic platform. Then the domestic
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f );
where the right hand term is strictly less than 1: However we should point that in this case
the tax will always hurt consumers, as stated below.
Proposition 8 If the market almost tips to the foreign platform in the absence of tax,
imposing a large tax may raise the domestic producers surplus if it raises su¢ ciently the
domestic platforms market share but would reduce consumer surplus.




























Suppose now that xB1 is close to one. Then the slope of H at x
B
1 = 1 is (using (25) and
B  1= (2t  (2   ))
H 0 (1) = (1   ) > 0
Moreover it can be readily shown at an equilibrium where xB1 ' 1;
H (1) = nf + (1   )  t
2






Because the function H is quadratic in xB1 ; these two facts imply that whenever the foreign
platform serves almost all the market, the consumer surplus is maximized when there is no
tax, that is H (1) > CS for any tax  > 0:
7 Conclusion
In a small open economy producing home language content, bilingualism allows domes-
tic consumers to enjoy foreign language content but may result in crowding-out of home
language content when foreign language content is a substitute to home language content.
Analyzing bilingualism from the perspective of the two-sided online intermediation mar-
ket generates the following novel insights. On the one hand, bilingualism has the benet
of increasing cross-side network externalities by raising concentration of consumers in the
foreign platform, which can increase the amount of home language content. On the other
hand, bilingualism can reduce the amount of home language content through two channels.
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Substitution between foreign and domestic content reduces expected surplus for domestic
CPs subscribing to the foreign platform. In addition, this substitution reduces the two-
sided market multiplier, which softens platform competition and induces both the foreign
and the domestic platforms to charge higher access fees to domestic CPs.
In our analysis, we neglected other potential benets of bilingualism. More specically,
bilingualism may induce more foreign platforms to enter the home country market and may
allow domestic CPs to create and export content in the foreign language.
Although our paper focuses on a hypothetical small open economy, our results provide
insights into the prevalence of US-originated platforms outside of the US. The presence of a
relatively large fraction of bilingual consumers in the home country allows a US platform to
leverage its access to the US content so that a tipping equilibrium can prevail in the home
country. Our results show that bilingualism can reduce the amount of home language
content when there is little di¤erentiation between competing platforms in terms of the
service they o¤er to consumers and a high degree of substitution between content in English
and content in the home language. Our analysis also highlights the importance of cultural
factors and characteristics of content as they a¤ect the volume of relevant English content
for a given country as well as the degree of substitution between content in the home
language and content in English.
Our paper is a rst step in the study of the economics of languages and platforms in
the Internet. There are many interesting issues for future research. Our present model
abstracts from competition among CPs on the platform to focus on competition between
platforms. One interesting line for future research is thus to endogeneize price formation
through content competition in order to understand the interaction between softening of
platform competition and intensication of competition among CPs within the foreign
platform induced by bilingualism. Another potential extension is related to the presence of
translation services (o¤ered by platforms such as Google). The quality of such services has
been increasing over time. Such an extension could be used to analyze how the increase
in the quality of the translation service a¤ects platform competition and domestic content
production. Yet another promising avenue is to extend the analysis beyond the small open
economy and explicitly model platform competition both in the bilingual home country
and in the monolingual foreign country.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is straightforward from the discussion in the main text. We here prove that
there is no tipping equilibrium. Suppose that all consumers subscribe to platform 1. If
platform 1 charges zero price, then platform 1 can attract a mass mb of CPs since a CPs
gross prot from subscribing to platform 1 is b. Hence, an upper bound on a consumers
expected gross surplus from joining platform 1 is u+abm. Under A2, the consumer located
at the opposite extreme point has an incentive to join platform 2 and obtain u rather than
to join platform 1 and obtain u+ abm  t < u .
9.2 Proof of Proposition 3
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nf : This implies that the condition holds for nf below some threshold nf  1
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As A1 implies bm < 1
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holds if nf is strictly above a threshold nf ; which
may be equal to the maximum level 1=2:
Suppose nf < nf  nf . Then, the optimal price for platform 1 is the highest price







. Given F2 = 0,
reducing F1 below F 1 is not protable because this deviation still allows platform 1 to corner
the market and in this case having F1 closer to F T1 increases its prot. Increasing the price
above F 1 (n
f ) is not protable either because this deviation makes platform 1 share the
market with platform 2, which is suboptimal.
9.3 Proof of Proposition 4
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f < nf :
9.4 Proof of Proposition 5
The proof of (i) is omitted as it follows the discussion in the main text.
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Given that M > B and xB1 > 1=2, the second ratio n
B
2 =n
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< xB1 < 1:
9.5 Normalization of the model to a = b = m = 1
Consider the original model with (a; b;m) in Section 2. Since the monolingual case is a
particular case of the bilingual one with nf = 0, we consider the bilingual case. Then,











x1(1  nf )b  F1

; n2 = m (x2b  F2) :
We can normalize the original model as follows:
exi = xi; eni = ni
bm
; enf = nf
bm




;ea = eb = em = 1:
Then we have exi = 1
2
+
(en1 + enf   2nfen1)  en2
2eten1 = ex1(1  nf )  eF1; n2 = ex2   eF2:
In the original model, the domestic welfare is given by:
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Note that the rst part of A1 is the same both in the original model and in the nor-
malized model and the second part of A1 becomes 1 > 2 in the normalized model. A2
becomes t > 1 in the normalized model.
9.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Both (i) and (iii) follow from the discussion in the main text. In what follows, we prove
(ii).
Consider consumer surplus. Under market sharing and nf = 1=2; we have
nf   txB1 = nB2   t(1  xB1 ):
Using this condition, we nd:


























which is convex in xB1 , increasing at x
B
1 = 1: The value at x
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as t > 1: The value at nf = 1=2 is
t





















which is negative for small t > 1, as shown by the plot below:






CS gain for nf = 1=2 and nf = 1=2:
Hence, for small t; CS increases with bilingualism only for nf large enough while for t
large it increases for all nf :























+ nf   nM   t
4
> 0; (27)
where the rst inequality is from nf  nf .

























When nf = 1=2 we have
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which is negative for all xB1 2 [0:5; 1].
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9.8 Proof of Lemma 7
Consumer surplus is
CS = (nB1 + n
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The domestic producer surplus is then
PS = nB2 F2 +
(nB1 )
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The tax revenue is
T = nB1 = 
 
xB1 (1  nf )  







































  []2 xB1 (1  nf );





= xB1 (1  nf )
9.8.1 Case  = 0













































































which holds because xB1 > 1=2 and the left-hand-side is less than 1.
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< 2 + 3B:
9.8.2 Case of a large market share







nf + 2(1   )  t
 dxB1
d
  (1  2nf ) < 0
because
















2 + B(1   ) + 2(1   )  (1   ) = (1   )
1 + B(1   )


























= (1  nf )














If 1 = 2nF , then we have
dxB1
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9.9 Extension: substitution among domestic content
We here extend our model to include substitution among home language content in addition
to the substitution between home language content and foreign content We provide an
extension which shows that our original model can be reinterpreted to accommodate the
substitution among home language content. A natural way to create competition among
home language content is to introduce some installed base of home language content: at the
outset, each platform is endowed with some mass of home language content. As we have a
symmetric model but for the presence of foreign content in the foreign platform, we assume
that each platform has nd > 0 mass of home language content as installed base. Therefore,
a consumer joining platform 2 expects to receive a surplus of a(n2+nd  2dn2nd) whereas
a domestic CP joining platform 2 expects to get a surplus of b(1 dnd)

(1  )xM2 + xB2

where d > 0 is a parameter of substitution.
The location of the monolingual consumer who is indi¤erent between the two platforms
is given by
a(n1 + n
d   2dn1nd)  tx1 = a(n2 + nd   2dn2nd)  t(1  x1);





a0 (n1   n2)
2t
; (28)
where a0  a(1  2dnd).
A bilingual consumer joining the foreign platform (i.e., platform 1) expects to get a
surplus of
a(n1 + n











fnf represents the overlap between foreign content and
the overlapping home language content between n1 and nd. For this subset of overlapping
content, we allocate a half to foreign CPs and the remaining half equally between the
installed base and the new domestic CPs.




d 2dn1nd+nf 2f (n1+nd 2dn1nd)nf ) tx1 = a(n2+nd 2dn2nd) t(1 x1):















Therefore, for a share  of bilingual consumers, a domestic CP joining platform 1 expects
to get a surplus of
b(1  dnd)(1  )xM1 + b






(1  )xM1 + xB1 (1  fnf )

The mass of CPs joining platform 1 is
n1 = mb
0 (1  )xM1 + xB1 (1  fnf ) mF1; (30)
where b0  b(1  dnd). The mass of CPs joining platform 2 is
n2 = mb
0 (1  )(1  xM1 ) + (1  xB1 ) mF2 (31)
We now examine how the introduction of substitution among home language content
modies the multipliers. Note rst that in the four equations (28)-(31) that determine 
xM1 ; x
B
1 ; n1; n2

, the installed base nd plays a role only through the term dnd. Therefore,
the model we previously considered can be interpreted as a model with some positive
installed base as long as d = 0.
Consider rst the monolingual case (i.e.,  = 0). Then, the current model with dnd >
0 is equivalent to the model we previously considered if we replace (a; b) with (a0; b0).
Therefore, the multiplier in the monolingual case becomes




2t  2amb(1   d) <
amb
2t  2amb = 
M(dnd = 0)
where (1    d) = (1   2dnd)(1   dnd). The substitution among home language content
reduces the multiplier in the monolingual case.
Consider now the bilingual case (i.e.,  = 1). Then, after some manipulation, we nd
that platform 1s consumer share is determined as follows
xB1 = constant+ 
B(dnd)(





B(dnd > 0) =
a0mb0
2t  a0mb0 [2   ] =
amb(1   d)
2t  2amb [2   ] (1   d)
<
amb
2t  amb [2   ] = 
B(dnd = 0):
Still, the multiplier in the bilingual case is obtained from the one in our previous model
(with dnd = 0) by replacing (a; b) with (a0; b0). The substitution among home language
content reduces the multiplier in the bilingual case as well.
Therefore, this extension shows that we can include the substitution among home lan-
guage content by considering a reduction in (a; b) in the original model and that the e¤ects
from the substitution between home language content and foreign content we identied in
the original model should qualitatively remain intact in this extension.
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9.10 Figures
Figure 1. Evolution of percentages of English speaking Internet users and web pages
(Pimienta, Prado and Blanco, 2009).
Figure 2. Amazon Kindles download share vs EPI.
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Figure 3. KKS download share vs EPI.
Figure 4. Amazon Kindles active user share vs EPI.
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Figure 5. KKS active user share vs EPI.
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9.11 Country data on platformsdownload (active user) shares
and the English Language Prociency Index (EPI).
The SimilarWebs data set (available through a free trial subscription on a demo platform)
includes app download and active user numbers36 in 29 countries only for the nearest
three consecutive months (which, at the time of this writing, is 12/2019 through 02/2020),
allowing only a cross-sectional correlation.
For each country, to calculate the download (active user) shares of individual e-reader
platforms, we divide their download (active user) number by the total number of downloads
(active users) of all e-reader apps, which provide both free and paid access to e-book titles
and rank among the top 100 apps in the category Books and References in Google Play
Store.
Note that worldwide, there are dozens of e-reader apps for Android devices, which can
enable access only to a limited number of free e-books available on-line in various formats.
For example, every country in the SimilarWebs data set has at least one popular e-reader
app which only allows free access to religious books (e.g., the Bible or the Koran). The
download and active user numbers for these apps in many countries are much higher than
for Amazon Kindle. To narrow down the e-reader market so that it best illustrates our
model, we chose not to include in our study the apps that allow access to only a limited
number of free e-books. There are 24 countries in the SimilarWebs data set which have
at least one well-known domestic e-reader platform providing access to both free and paid
titles in the domestic language.
Also note that we do not include the Google Play Books (GPB) app download and active
user data in our analysis of market shares of the major e-reader platforms of the English-
language origin. On average 22% percent of the GPB app users in the countries in the
SimilarWebs sample rely on the GPB app version which was preinstalled on their Android
devices. However, all GPB app versions (either preinstalled or downloaded and installed
after users purchased their devices) are much better integrated with the Android operating
system than any other e-reader app. Therefore, we interpret GPB as an app which is tied
with the Googles Android operating system. Recent research on tying in two-sided markets
has shown that the rm engaging in this strategy can inate its market share relative to no
tying (see Choi and Jeon, 2019). Since competing platforms in our model do not engage in
tying, we choose to omit the GPB app from our empirical illustration of the relationship
between e-reader platformsmarket shares and the English language prociency.
We should also note that although Google Play Store is o¢ cially blocked in China, a
36Users who opened the app at least once per month are considered active.
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person using a Chinese smartphone can still download an app from a Google Play Store
outside of China using a VPN (in Hong Kong, for example). SimilarWeb is able to track
such users because the VPN can mask the users location at the time of the download but
not the country where the device is customarily used.
Finally, note that in our estimation of correlations between the EPI and English-
language e-reader platformsmarket shares, we used data for only 28 countries in the
SimilarWebs data set (which contains data for 29 countries) as we excluded from the set
the data on Japan. We view Japan as an outlier among countries with low English lan-
guage prociency. Amazon, the Japans leading e-book provider, entered Japan very early
(in 2000) by leveraging its market share among Japanese customers buying foreign books
from the U.S. on-line store Amazon.com as Japan was the second largest book market in
the world. Moreover, Amazon has been number one e-commerce platform in Japan since
it overtook its rival Rakuten in 2016.
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Table A.1 The EPI, market shares of Kindle and the combined market shares of

















Argentina 57.58 0.11 0.81 0.08 0.13 YES
Austria 63.13 0.56 0.30 0.44 0.46 YES
Brazil 50.93 0.42 0.52 0.31 0.34 YES
China 51.94 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.07 YES
France 55.49 0.45 0.42 0.24 0.28 YES
Germany 63.74 0.54 0.35 0.41 0.43 YES
Greece 58.49 0.18 0.67 0.08 0.14 NO
Hungary 59.51 0.10 0.70 0.13 0.21 NO
India 57.13 0.39 0.56 0.43 0.45 YES
Indonesia 51.58 0.05 0.77 0.07 0.13 NO
Israel 58.7* 0.66 0.19 0.37 0.40 YES
Italy 55.77 0.53 0.38 0.34 0.38 YES
Japan 51.8 0.68 0.29 0.66 0.66 YES
Malaysia 59.32 0.14 0.75 0.11 0.17 YES
Mexico 49.76 0.23 0.70 0.16 0.20 YES
Netherlands 70.31 0.14 0.70 0.15 0.24 YES
Philippines 61.84 0.11 0.72 0.11 0.18 NO
Poland 62.45 0.14 0.41 0.07 0.08 YES
Portugal 60.02 0.24 0.57 0.14 0.21 YES
Russia 52.96 0.08 0.25 0.03 0.03 YES
Singapore 68.63 0.40 0.51 0.30 0.40 YES
South_Africa 66.52 0.17 0.78 0.16 0.20 YES
Spain 55.85 0.56 0.35 0.26 0.29 YES
Taiwan 51.88 0.13 0.66 0.12 0.30 YES
Thailand 48.54 0.23 0.70 0.13 0.14 YES
Turkey 47.17 0.04 0.90 0.03 0.05 YES
Ukraine 52.86 0.09 0.45 0.04 0.05 YES
United Arab Emirates 47.27 0.27 0.67 0.16 0.20 NO
Vietnam 53.12 0.34 0.62 0.24 0.25 YES
Average 56.63 0.28 0.54 0.20 0.24
* Educaton First does not provide the EPI for Israel but reports that countriesEPIs are strongly
correlated with their average TOEFL iBT scores. Therefore, we estimated Israels EPI using the
countrys average TOEFL iBT score for 2017 reported by the Educational Testing Service (see
www.ets.org/toe).
**App shares are based on the total app download and active user data for the period from 12/2019
through 02/2020.
*** Based on our own research as of January 19, 2020.
Sources: SimilarWeb Analytics, pro.similarweb.com; EF Education First, 2019.
49
10 Online appendix: the mixed case
This online appendix analyzes the mixed case where a share  2 (0; 1) of consumers
are bilingual and others are monolingual. We assume that a consumers location on the
Hotelling line is independently distributed of the consumers language skill. We rst study
the simple case of no substitution between domestic content and foreign content and per-
form comparative static. We then characterize the interior equilibrium of the general case
with substitution between domestic content and foreign content.
10.1 No substitution between domestic content and foreign con-
tent ( = 0)
Suppose no substitution between foreign content and domestic content (i.e.,  = 0). We
focus on an interior equilibrium where both platforms are active in both segments (mono-
lingual and bilingual) of the consumer market.
In the mixed case, platform is share of monolingual consumers xMi is given by (1) while
platform 1s share of bilingual consumers xB1 is given by (2). As there is no substitution
between foreign and home language content (i.e.,  = 0), the mass of CPs joining platform





for i = 1; 2; (32)
where xAi  (1  )xMi + xBi denotes platform is overall (or average) consumer share for







































1 ) denotes a constant in the demand for platform 1s service among monolingual
consumers (bilingual consumers). Note that when nf = 0, we have cM1 = c
B
1 = 1=2 because
both platforms are completely symmetric. When nf > 0, as bilingual consumers enjoy the
foreign content whereas monolingual consumers do not, the foreign platform captures a
larger market share among bilingual consumers than among monolingual consumers. Note
that when the prices are equal; F1 = F2; the foreign platforms share among monolingual
consumers is larger than the domestic platforms market share. This is due to the indirect
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network e¤ects: as its share of bilingual consumers increases, the foreign platform attracts
more domestic CPs, which in turn increases its share of monolingual consumers. This can
be also seen from the fact that cM1 increases with the multiplier 
M .
From (33) and (34), we nd that the multiplier does not change with nf and is given by
M in (5). This is because we assume that  = 0. Therefore, platform is prot i = Fini







for i = 1; 2: (35)
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implies xB1 > x
M
1 . With these consumer market shares, we can
characterize the equilibrium as follows
Proposition 9 (mixed case: equilibrium) Consider the setting with  = 0, nf > 0 and
 2 (0; 1). If nf is small enough such that xB1 in (37) is less than one, we have:
(i) The equilibrium consumer market shares of platform 1, xM1 and x
B
1 , are given re-




1 = (1  )xMi + xBi > 1=2.





and ni = mbxAi
M + 1
M + 2
, for i = 1; 2: (38)
Proof. (i) From (36) and (37), platform 1s overall consumer share xA1 is given by
xA1 =

(1  )cM1 + cB1


















. The rest of the proof is omitted as
it follows from the discussion in the main text.
(ii) Condition (38) follows from (32) and (35).
We now perform the comparative static analysis with respect to nf and . Consider
rst an increase in nf . Note rst that both cB1 and c
M



















As mentioned above the foreign platforms advantage relative to the domestic platform
among bilingual consumers extends to monolingual consumers due to higher domestic CP
participation in the foreign platform. An increase in nf strengthens this advantage of the
foreign platform among bilingual consumers as well as its advantage among monolingual
consumers through the indirect network e¤ects.
It is quite intuitive that an increase in the amount of foreign content available in the
foreign platform increases the foreign platforms equilibrium market share among bilingual
consumers. The e¤ect of an increase in nf on the foreign platforms share among mono-
lingual consumers is less straightforward because the advantage of the foreign platform in
terms of CPs participation is mitigated by the reduction of the subscription price of the
domestic platform. But after some manipulation,37 we nd that an increase in nf increases
xM1 as well as x
B
1 :












An increase in the fraction of bilingual consumers raises the foreign platforms advantage
relative to the domestic platform among bilingual consumers and indirectly among mono-
lingual consumers. We also nd that an increase in the share  of bilingual consumers raises




1 . This prediction is consistent with the empirical observation noted
in the introduction that Amazon Kindles app market share increases with the English
prociency of the population.
Finally, regrading the e¤ect on domestic CPs participation ni, condition (38) implies
that there is no direct e¤ect of nf or  on ni: indeed ni is a¤ected only through the
change in xAi . An increase in x
A
1 (and hence, a corresponding reduction in x
A
2 ) induces a
proportionate increase in n1 (respectively, reduction in n2) such that the total participation
of CPs n1 + n2 is constant:




Summarizing these results, we have
Proposition 10 (mixed case: comparative static) Consider the setting of  = 0, nf > 0
and  2 (0; 1). In the interior equilibrium, in which xB1 in (37) is less than one, we have:











(ii) Increasing nf or  induces an increase in n1 and an equal reduction in n2:






















































The point (ii) follows from condition (38) and the fact that the market is covered.
We now perform welfare analysis. Note that the intensity of competition is independent
of  or nf (i.e., M = B). We study how  changes the domestic welfare in the interior
equilibrium characterized.
Regarding consumer surplus, we have:



































As we have 2xA1 > 1 and
@xB1
@













which we verify to hold. Therefore, consumer surplus increases with  for two reasons.
First, more bilingual consumers enjoy the foreign content. Second, the overall amount
of domestic content per consumer increases with  because of economies of scale in the
interactions between consumers and CPs. As  increases, both platform 1s consumer
market share and its mass of domestic CPs increase while the reverse holds for platform
2. However, the total mass of domestic CPs, n1 + n2, remains constant. This implies that
as  increases, on average, consumers get access to a larger amount of domestic content.
This is very clear when xA1 is close to 1, as in this case almost all consumers have access to
twice the amount domestic content in the monolingual case.

































As xA1 increases with n
f , there is some threshold nf such that below the threshold (above the
threshold), the producer surplus decreases (increases) with . A higher  reduces platform
2s prot but raises CPssurplus because they also benet from economies of scale in their
interactions with consumers (just as consumers benet from their interactions with CPs).
Note that 1 > 3+
M
4+2M
> 1=2. Basically, when xA1 is close to 1=2, as  increases, the reduction
in platform 2s prot dominates the increase in domestic CPssurplus whereas the opposite
holds when xA1 is close to 1.
Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 11 (domestic welfare) Consider the interior equilibrium in the case of  2
(0; 1), nf > 0 and  = 0:
(i) As  increases, consumer surplus increases.
(ii) As  increases, there is a threshold nf such that producer surplus increases if and
only if nf is larger than the threshold.
Proof. We omit the proof as the results follow from the discussions in the main text.
10.2 Substitution between domestic content and foreign content
( > 0)
Consider now the case of substitution between domestic content and foreign content ( > 0).































































2 ) is a multiplier in the two-sided market associated with F1 (F2).

























































2 ) is a multiplier in the two-sided market associated with F1 (F2).
Regarding the multipliers, we have
Lemma 2 When nf > 0; under assumptions A1 and A2, each of the four multipliers














1 are obvious. To save space, we below prove only that 
M
1













Let f (g) represent the numerator (the denominator) of the R.H.S. We nd
f 0g   fg0 =  amb2

















where the last inequality is obtained from t > amb and 1 > 2nf .
When nf = 0, all four multipliers have the same value equal to amb
2t 2amb = 
M . Consider
now nf > 0. An increase in nf reduces all four multipliers because this weakens the
positive feedback through the substitution e¤ect experienced by domestic CPs and bilingual
consumers in the foreign platform. More precisely, this substitution directly reduces the
magnitude of changes in n1 and xB1 at each iteration of dynamic feedback process. But





(respectively, in n1 and n2) in the next round of the feedback, which in turn reduces the
feedback in the subsequent rounds. As the degree of substitution increases with nf , an
increase in nf reduces all four multipliers and thereby weakens competition between the
two platforms.
Since the substitution arises when bilingual consumers consume content in the foreign
































































From the FOCs, we nd
F1 =



































































































































































Note that the denominator is the same in (44) and (45). In the case of the numerator,
if we assume nf = 0, the numerator of (45) can be obtained from the numerator of (44)
by replacing  with (1  ) and the superscript M with B (and B with M).
The interior equilibrium exists whenever xM1 in (44) and x
B





(0; 1)2. Then, xM1 (respectively, x
B
1 ) is platform 1s share among monolingual consumers
(respectively, among bilingual consumers). The equilibrium fees are obtained from (42),
(43), (44), and (45).
57
